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DRAWING THE LINE: BUCKLEY'S IMPACT ON
THE INTERSECTION OF CONTRIBUTIONS AND
THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Stefanie Dresdner Lincoln*
[Tihe only effective restraint upon executive policy
and power. . . may lie in an enlightened citizenry-in
an informed and critical public opinion which alone
can here protect the values of democratic
government. 1
In an effort to thrive as an enlightened citizenry, we employ a
variety of information-sharing tactics in our everyday lives that enhance
our own knowledge and proliferate discussion to enhance the awareness
of others. We educate ourselves and our fellow citizens in classrooms
and newspapers, on street comers and doorsteps. We ask others to
support our causes, to join in our beliefs, to change the world through
policies-whether they involve school lunches or foreign aid. We
organize together to fill in the gaps where our governmental policies are
unable to handle the load. We contribute our time and our financial
resources as a means of voicing support and affecting (or preventing)
change in our society. These efforts to become an informed public,
necessary to balancing the power of the government and preserving
democracy, encompass an infinite number of interactions, not all of
which deserve absolute protection under the First Amendment, and some
of which fail to constitute speech at all.
The Supreme Court over the years has attempted to identify
some of these boundaries of the First Amendment, assigning varying
* Juris Doctor Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2010.
Thanks to Professor Bill Marshall for his thoughtful guidance.
1. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 728 (1971) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
levels of scrutiny to different types of speech in an effort to strike an
adequate balance between state interests and individual rights. Despite
these endeavors, there still remains a great deal of ambiguity as to
whether those who express and associate through the contribution of
their financial resources deserve protection under the First Amendment
and, if so, what degree of scrutiny is appropriate.
The question of when contributions constitute speech first arose
in Buckley v. Valeo2 in 1976, in which the Supreme Court shed some
light on this issue in the arena of political campaign contributions. In
finding heightened scrutiny appropriate for analyzing the contributions at
issue in Buckley,3 the Supreme Court failed to explicitly define the
boundaries of its holding as it might relate or extend to other types of
contributions. Outside of this narrow situation, the degree of First
Amendment protection owed to other types of contributions has not
played a central role in constitutional law, leaving the unresolved
question: when do contributions constitute speech?
Recent developments in national security law have given various
circuits the opportunity to address this issue while determining the
constitutionality of a statute prohibiting contributions to foreign terrorist
organizations ("FTOs").4  Although the prohibition against these
particular contributions seems like a straightforward concept within
national security efforts, the analysis becomes complicated when the
organizations to which donations are prohibited also conduct
humanitarian efforts and political advocacy, bringing into the mix the
not-so-straightforward interests of the First Amendment. These cases
provide a context which highlights the confusion among jurisdictions as
to how far Buckley's standard of scrutiny should extend, and at what
point contributions become speech protected by the First Amendment.
Although the contributions at issue relate to organizations engaging in
terrorist activity, the contributing parties' claims assert the more general
rights under the First Amendment to associate and express support for
humanitarian or political causes. The perspectives of circuits addressing
these claims are thereby significant not only in the area of national
security, but as precedent for addressing restrictions on contributions to
2. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
3. See id. at 21.
4. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2006); see infra, Parts I and H.
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further any humanitarian causes or political advocacy.
The constitutional arguments of those who have contributed or
seek to contribute to these prohibited organizations are plentiful,
implicating the First and Fifth Amendments through vagueness,
overbreadth, scienter, expression, and association issues.5 Amongst all
of these claims rests the question of how to deal with these contributions
insofar as they are protected by the First Amendment. Faced with a
panoply of claims and little Supreme Court guidance, the courts have
largely glossed over this question in one way or another, relying on the
paramount national security interest of the government in order to
dispose of the issue and move on to the next. The split which emerged
among jurisdictions as to what standard of scrutiny is appropriate when
considering the degree of protection deserved by these contributions has
caused the lack of applicable precedent and adequate attention to become
evermore apparent. These holdings side with one of two Supreme Court
tests and draw varying lines as to when heightened or intermediate
scrutiny should apply. Although the level of scrutiny was of little
consequence to the holdings of the cases with which they dealt, the
circuits resigned themselves to drastically different precedents which will
apply in evaluating contributions in other contexts which do not involve
the heavy hand of national security interests. Thus, with limited written
reasoning or consideration, the circuits apparently would provide
different levels of protection when faced with the First Amendment
challenges to restrictions on different types of contributions. For
example, a restriction on contributions made to organizations dedicated
to relief in Darfur may be evaluated under strict scrutiny, while a
restriction on contributions for cancer research may receive intermediate
scrutiny or rational basis treatment. Although easily overlooked in the
context of terrorism prevention, this inconsistency has broad implications
and exposes a gap left by Supreme Court rulings.
This Note analyzes the issues raised by courts facing § 2339B
constitutional questions and the split in choosing the appropriate level of
scrutiny when those courts consider First Amendment problems with
banning contributions to FTOs. Part I examines the statutory and
5. See, e.g., Humanitarian Law Project v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 1122 (2d Cir.
2007) (addressing each of these types of claims in evaluating a challenge to the
constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B).
2009] 447
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constitutional framework of the associational and expressive claims
raised in these cases. Part II analyzes the approaches and rationales-or
lack thereof-employed by five courts in different circuits attempting to
fill in the gap left by the Supreme Court in analyzing the level of First
Amendment protection appropriate for contributions violating § 2339B.
This section highlights the inconsistent and sometimes arbitrary theories
employed by these five illustrative cases resulting in very different
conclusions as to the First Amendment value of the contributions at
issue. Finally, Part III discusses the rationality of expanding protection
to various types of contributions and proposes that a broader perspective
of political expression and association is required to preserve the First
Amendment interests of citizens.
PART I. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
A. The Constitutional Context: Buckley v. Valeo
• • 6
The lines of cases addressing freedom of association and
6. The freedom of association is rooted in the idea that "[e]ffective advocacy
of both public and private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is
undeniably enhanced by group association." NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson,
357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958). The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized two distinct
types of situations in which the freedom of association is protected. The first
involves "intimate human relationships" protected as "a fundamental element of
personal liberty." Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1984) (upholding
the Minnesota Human Rights Act prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex
against a challenge by an organization found in violation of the Act because its
membership was limited to men). The additional meaning of the freedom of
association, as expressed by the Court in Roberts v. U. S. Jaycees, establishes the
"right to associate for the purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the
First Amendment-speech, assembly, petition for the redress of grievances, and the
exercise of religion. The Constitution guarantees freedom of association of this kind
as an indispensable means of preserving other individual liberties." Id. at 618. The
Court in Roberts also recognized that it has "long understood as implicit in the right
to engage in activities protected by the First Amendment a corresponding right to
associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic,
educational, religious, and cultural ends." Id. at 622. Governmental attempts to
restrict this right of expressive association must be analyzed under strict scrutiny,
requiring "compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that
cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational
[Vol. 7
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protection of symbolic or expressive conduct 7 collide in the area of
donations as expression and as a means of association. Various circuits
addressing whether the ban on contributions to FTOs under § 2339B
violates the First Amendment freedoms of association and expression
reach the same conclusion that the provision is constitutional. Beneath
the consistent holdings, however, courts employ inconsistent reasoning,
relying on varying standards and cherry picking from the reasoning of
other circuits and Supreme Court cases to create unclear standards for
freedoms." Id. at 623.
7. The right to free expression reaches beyond the spoken and written word
into at least some forms of conduct. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty.
Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (holding that the wearing of black armbands to
express objection to the Vietnam War warranted First Amendment protection). The
Court in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), established the longstanding
test to be applied to incidental restrictions on First Amendment rights resulting from
regulation of conduct. In O'Brien, the defendant challenged the constitutionality of
the law under which he was prosecuted, which banned the destruction of a draft card,
by claiming that his burning of the draft card was a "'demonstration against the war
and against the draft."' Id. at 376. Upholding the law, the Court in O'Brien held
that, where a regulation is within the constitutional power of the government, that
regulation is justified "if it furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest[,] if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression[,] and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms
is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest." Id. at 377.
Although the Court in O'Brien supplied the current standard for incidental
restrictions on First Amendment freedoms by acts regulating conduct, the Court did
not supply a clear answer as to what constituted expressive conduct warranting
application of the O'Brien test. In fact, the Court never actually concluded whether
or not the burning of a draft card at issue constituted such conduct, but instead
assumed arguendo "that the alleged communicative element in O'Brien's conduct
[was] sufficient to bring into play the First Amendment." Id. at 376.
The Court in Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc.
("FAIR"), 547 U.S. 47 (2006), helped to clarify standards of what constitutes
protected conduct warranting application of O'Brien. The plaintiffs in FAIR
challenged the constitutionality of a law prohibiting law schools from restricting
military recruiters' access to their campuses, claiming that exclusionary practice was
an expression of disagreement with certain military policies. Id. at 65-66. The
Court in FAIR limited conduct deserving of "First Amendment protection only to
conduct that is inherently expressive." Id. at 66 (emphasis added). The Court
concluded that conduct which requires explanation in order for an observer to
understand its expressive value, and which otherwise would not be recognized as
speech, is not deserving of First Amendment protection under O'Brien. Id.
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evaluating the constitutionality of restrictions on non-campaign
8
contributions.
Though the Supreme Court has provided little guidance in
discerning the standard to be applied when evaluating the
constitutionality of restrictions on financial contributions, it did, as
previously mentioned, speak directly to the issue in the context of
campaign contributions in Buckley. In order to fully understand the
reasoning of the various circuits addressing the constitutionality of §
2339B, it is necessary to look first at the standard established in Buckley.
The plaintiffs in Buckley challenged the constitutionality of the
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, which, among other regulations,
set campaign contribution and expenditure limits. 9 In addressing the
constitutionality of contribution and expenditure limitations, the Court
rejected as inappropriate the O'Brien intermediate scrutiny analysis
applied by the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, finding that "[t]he
expenditure of money simply cannot be equated with such conduct as
destruction of a draft card."'"
Although the Court distinguished expenditures from
contributions, finding that expenditure limitations have a greater impact
on free expression, it acknowledged that "[a] contribution serves as a
general expression of support for the candidate and his views."'" The
Court held:
A limitation on the amount of money a person may
give to a candidate or campaign organization ...
involves little direct restraint on his political
communication, for it permits the symbolic
expression of support evidenced by a contribution
but does not in any way infringe the contributor's
8. See infra, Part II.
9. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1976) (per curiam).
10. Id. at 16. The Court also noted that, even if the use of money in Buckley
were categorized as conduct, the restrictions at issue would fail the O'Brien test
because "the governmental interests advanced in support of the Act involve[d]
'suppressing communication."' Id. at 17. The Court also rejected the argument that
the restrictions fell in line with a number of cases upholding time, place, and manner
restrictions, finding that the contribution and expenditure limitations imposed "direct
quantity restrictions on political communication and association .... Id. at 18.
11. Id. at21.
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freedom to discuss candidates and issues.12
The Court also found that contribution limitations "impinge[d]
on protected associational freedoms."' 3  The Court reasoned that
"[miaking a contribution . . . serves to affiliate a person with a
,,14 • 15
candidate. In the midst of a convoluted discussion of contributions,
expenditures, expression, and association, the Court in Buckley
established a standard to deal with such limitations, holding that "[e]ven
a 'significant interference with protected rights of political association'
may be sustained if the State demonstrates a sufficiently important
interest and employs means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary
abridgment of associational [and expressive] freedoms."' 6 In applying
this heightened scrutiny to the limitations in Buckley, the Court found a
sufficiently important government interest in limiting the "actuality and
appearance of corruption resulting from large individual financial
contributions."' 7
Throughout its analysis, the Court did not identify the scope of
its holding, leaving open the question of Buckley's effect on other types
of contributions. The Buckley opinion provides language that lower
12. Id.
13. Id. at22.
14. Id.
15. See William P. Marshall, The Last Best Chance for Campaign Finance
Reform, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 335, 350-51 (Winter 2000) (outlining reasons why critics
of Buckley "agree that the Court made an incoherent distinction between
contributions and expenditures").
16. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25 (internal quotations removed) (citing Cousins v.
Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 488 (1975)). The Supreme Court in Nixon v. Shrink, 528
U.S. 377 (2000), clarified the standard as applying to both associational and
expressive freedoms:
While we did not attempt to parse distinctions between the
speech and association standards of scrutiny for contribution
limits, we did make it clear that those restrictions bore more
heavily on the associational right than on freedom to speak.
We consequently proceeded on the understanding that a
contribution limitation surviving a claim of associational
abridgment would survive a speech challenge as well, and
we held the standard satisfied by the contribution limits
under review.
Id. at 388 (internal citation omitted).
17. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26.
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courts have used to support both sides of the debate (in some unexpected
contexts). As previously mentioned, the question has been raised on
several occasions in challenging the constitutionality of a ban on
contributions to any foreign terrorist organization, contained in § 2339B
of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
("AEDPA"). is
B. Terrorism Prevention Legislation
In April 1996, Congress passed the AEDPA to prevent terrorist
organizations from acquiring funds "through affiliated groups or
individuals" functioning as a front for these organizations. 9  Section
2339B(a)(1) of the Act provides in relevant part:
Whoever knowingly provides material support or
resources to a foreign terrorist organization, or
attempts or conspires to do so, shall be fined under
this title or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or
both .... To violate this paragraph, a person must
have knowledge that the organization is a designated
terrorist organization (as defined in subsection
(g)(6)), that the organization has engaged or engages
in terrorist activity (as defined in section
212(a)(3)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act) or that the organization has engaged or engages
in terrorism (as defined in section 140(d)(2) of the
20Foreign Relations Authorization Act).
Congress defined "material support or resources" as:
any property, tangible or intangible, or service,
including currency or monetary instruments or
financial securities, financial services, lodging,
training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses,
false documentation or identification,
communications equipment, facilities, weapons,
lethal substances, explosives, personnel (1 or more
18. Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 301(6), 110 Stat. 1247 (1996).
19. Id.
20. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2006).
[Vol. 7
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individuals who may be or include oneself), and
transportation, except medicine or religious
materials.2 '
The current scienter requirement in § 2339B calling for only
knowledge of the organization's status, as opposed to specific intent to
further the organization's illegal aims, was clarified in amendments
contained in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004 ("IRTPA"). These amendments followed a split in statutory
interpretation among several circuits-more specifically, an opinion by a
district court in the Eleventh Circuit interpreting the statute as requiring
specific intent and finding that such a requirement is necessary in order
22for the statute to pass constitutional muster. Thus, if a contributor
intended only to give funds to the charitable or political advocacy
activities of an organization designated as an FTO, the contributor is
materially supporting terrorism so long as he is aware of the
organization's status or illegal activities, regardless of his actual
intentions.
In 8 U.S.C. § 1189, Congress authorized the Secretary of State to
designate as an FTO any organization the Secretary finds to be a foreign
organization engaging in terrorist activity or terrorism (or which "retains
the capability and intent to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism"), and
whose terrorist activities the Secretary finds to threaten the national
23
security of the United States or U.S. nationals. The Secretary is not
required under this section to notify either the designated organization or
its donors personally. Although the Secretary is required to notify and
provide reasoning to the leaders and relevant committee members of the
House of Representatives and Senate, the only public notice required is
24publication in the Federal Register. Once an organization's designation
as an FTO is published in the Federal Register, any material support, as
25defined in § 2339A, violates § 2339B.The broad reach of this statute has precipitated a variety of First
21. 18 U.S.C. §2339A(b)(1) (2006).
22. United States v. Al-Arian, 308 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1341 (M.D. Fla. 2004).
23. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1) (2006).
24. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(2)(i) (2006).
25. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(2)(ii) (2006).
2009) 453
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26Amendment challenges. Although the Supreme Court has never
addressed the constitutionality of § 2339B, several courts have addressed
the claims that the statute infringes on rights of association and
expression and have consistently reached the same result that § 2339B is
27
constitutional. A closer look at the reasoning among jurisdictions,
however, reveals inconsistencies. Before determining the proper
standard of analysis for contributions violating § 2339B, it is necessary
first to look at the divergent approaches taken by various circuits.
II. INCONSISTENT TREATMENT: FIVE ILLUSTRATIVE CASES
A. Humanitarian I
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Humanitarian Law Project v.
Reno (Humanitarian I) provides a heavily cited decision on the
applicable standard for evaluating § 2339 contributions. The plaintiffs in
Humanitarian I wished to contribute funds to the Kurdistan Workers'
Party ("PKK") and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam ("LTTE"),
organizations listed as FTOs, and sought injunctive relief barring
28
enforcement of the AEDPA. Among several First Amendment claims,
plaintiffs argued that § 2339B "infringe[d] their associational rights
under the First Amendment," as their support was meant to aid
humanitarian and political activities of the organizations. 29 The court
rejected the argument that Buckley should apply to the contributions,
limiting the application of Buckley's heightened scrutiny to
"organizations whose overwhelming function [is] political advocacy., 30
The court in Humanitarian I held instead that contributions to
organizations which do not fall under Buckley constitute only expressive
conduct regulated under O'Brien.31  The court asserted that "[t]he
government may... regulate contributions to organizations that engage
26. See supra text accompanying note 4.
27. See, e.g., United States v. AI-Arian, 308 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1343 (M.D. Fla.
2004); Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2000).
28. Id. at 1133.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1134.
31. Id. at 1135.
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in lawful-but non-speech related-activities.""
The Ninth Circuit's reasoning in limiting Buckley in this manner,
however, was largely unclear and unsupported. As an initial matter, the
court did not provide reasoning or support for its finding that whether a
contribution deserves higher scrutiny than O'Brien's intermediate
scrutiny depends upon the degree to which that organization practices
political advocacy. Assuming, arguendo, that the court was correct in
limiting the scope of Buckley to "organizations whose overwhelming
•,,33
function [is] political advocacy, the court neither defined the vague
term "political advocacy" nor established criteria to identify activities
that would fall within this category. The court also provided no guidance
with respect to whether "political advocacy" encompasses legislative
advocacy or whether it only includes supporting a candidate in a
governmental election campaign.
Furthermore, the opinion offered only a brief footnote addressing
the organizations to which the plaintiffs wished to contribute in the
context of the discussion of limiting Buckley to political advocacy
groups. This peculiar note characterized the central issue as "the right of
Americans to express their association with foreign political groups
through donations. '34 Focusing on the aims of the organizations to affect
change in a foreign government, the court asserted that "the political
advocacy of the PKK and LTTE directed toward their own government
is not protected by our First Amendment."
35
As an initial matter, the court's mischaracterization of the issue
as to whether the organization was entitled to First Amendment
protection ignores the issue of the rights of donors as citizens or those
deserving of constitutional protection. It is not the First Amendment
rights of the organization, but the rights of the donors to associate and
express support for an idea, that is the concern of Buckley and its
progeny.
Moreover, the court appeared to be grasping at straws in effort to
support its exclusion of the PKK and LTTE from the category of political
advocacy groups deserving Buckley protection. Perhaps to avoid
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1134.
34. Id. at 1134 n.1 (citation omitted).
35. Id.
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assessing the organizations at issue in Humanitarian I using its own
standard of "overwhelming political advocacy," the court cited as itsS36
only authority in this footnote United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,
describing the latter as a case in which the Court "refus[ed] to extend
constitutional protection to [a] Mexican citizen." 37 The facts of Verdugo-
Urquidez, however, are hardly similar to those in Humanitarian I. The
Court in Verdugo-Urquidez held that the Fourth Amendment did not
apply to a search and seizure of property located in Mexico and owned
by a Mexican citizen and resident "with no voluntary attachment to the
United States. 38 Dealing only with a foreign citizen with no voluntary
connection to the United States and activities taking place solely outside
the United States, there is, at best, only the slightest of connections
between this Fourth Amendment case and the First Amendment claims in
Humanitarian L The Humanitarian I court's disingenuous use of
Verdugo-Urquidez provided little by way of support for its
mischaracterization of the issue of the protection deserved by the PKK
and LTTE, and seems entirely irrelevant to the issue of the degree of
First Amendment protection owed to the hopeful donors to these
organizations.
As quickly as the Ninth Circuit distinguished the contributions at
issue from those in Buckley, it just as quickly relied on Young v. New
York City Transit Authority,39 where the Second Circuit upheld a ban on
panhandling in the subways, in support of its finding that the government
may regulate the plaintiffs' desired contributions in Humanitarian I
despite any expressive component achieved through the act of
contribution. 40 This reliance on Young is noteworthy for several reasons.
The immediate transition from rejecting Buckley's application to relying
on Young seems to indicate that the court found contributions to non-
political advocacy organizations (whatever that term is meant to
encompass) more similar to begging in New York subways than to
political campaign contributions. The connection drawn by the Ninth
36. 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
37. Humanitarian I, 205 F.3d at 1134 n. 1.
38. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 274-75.
39. 903 F.2d 146, 157 (2nd Cir. 1990) (upholding a ban on panhandling in
New York City subways after applying intermediate scrutiny).
40. Humanitarian 1,-205 F.3d at 1135.
Circuit between contributions and panhandling appears tenuous not only
in light of its juxtaposition with campaign contributions, but also as a
result of Young's focus on the speech value of solicitations as opposed to
contributions.
Additionally, the court in Young distinguished "begging [by
individuals from] . .. solicitation by organized charities. '41 Significant
to the Second Circuit's reasoning is its recognition that, "[w]hile
organized charities serve community interests by enhancing
communication and disseminating ideas, the conduct of begging and
panhandling in the subway amounts to nothing less than a menace to the
,,42
common good. This clear distinction further weakens the
substantiality of the Ninth Circuit's reliance on Young, as the
organizations at issue in Humanitarian I would more likely fall into the
Second Circuit's category of an organized charity than begging or
panhandling. In choosing to apply O'Brien and relying on Young, the
question remains whether the Ninth Circuit departed from the Supreme
Court's finding that "[t]he expenditure of money simply cannot be
equated with such conduct as destruction of a draft card.,
43
Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit's findings in Humanitarian I have
influenced the decisions of several other circuits facing First Amendment
challenges to § 2339B.
B. Hammoud and Warsame
In United States v. Hammoud,4 the Fourth Circuit addressed the
standard applicable to contributions to Hizballah that violated § 2339B in
addressing the First Amendment claims of a Lebanese citizen who had
gained permanent resident status by marrying a United States citizen.45
The Hammoud court, in a somewhat dismissive footnote, rejected the
41. Young, 903 F.2d at 155-56.
42. Id. at 156.
43. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16 (1975).
44. 381 F.3d 316 (4th Cir. 2004). Although there is subsequent history
regarding this case, it affected only the sentencing portions of the decision, and not
the substantive decision. See United States v. Hammoud, 405 F.3d 1034 (4th Cir.
2005).
45. Hammoud, 381 F.3d at 325.
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plaintiffs argument that Buckley should apply in evaluating the
46
constitutionality of the contribution ban. It peremptorily stated that
"Hizballah is not a political advocacy group" and that "while providing
monetary support to Hizballah may have an expressive component, it is
not the equivalent of pure political speech., 47 The court gave no further
explanation either as to why Hizballah is not a political advocacy group
or how the court came to the conclusion that its status as a non-political
advocacy group precluded Buckley from applying. The court merely
cited Humanitarian I to support its decision, failing to fully flesh out its
First Amendment basis.48
A Minnesota District Court in the Eighth Circuit built upon this
trend of conclusory statements supported by similarly dismissive
49findings from other circuits in United States v. Warsame. Plaintiff, in a
motion to dismiss two counts of an indictment against him, argued that
Buckley required that strict scrutiny apply in evaluating the
constitutionality of § 2339B under the First Amendment as applied to
contributions to al Qaeda. 50 In rejecting this argument the court, after
summarizing Buckley, stated the premise from Humanitarian I that "such
contributions are deemed protected political speech only when made to
an organization 'whose overwhelming function [is] political
advocacy.' 5'
The court in Warsame gave no further explanation as to why
Buckley should be limited to such organizations, but instead relied only
on Humanitarian I's conclusory statement to exclude Buckley from
applying to non-political advocacy organizations. Moreover, the court,
like those in Humanitarian I and Hammoud, failed to identify a set of
criteria which would aid in determining whether or not an entity qualifies
as a political advocacy organization. In fact, the court merely stated that
"[a]l Qaeda is not a political advocacy group," citing only Hammoud's
46. Id. at 328 n.3.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. 537 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (D. Minn. 2008).
50. Id. at 1015.
51. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205
F.3d 1330, 1134-35 (9th Cir. 2000)).
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treatment of Hizballah as support.52 Thus, not only did the court neglect
to analyze the organization at issue to establish reasoning as to its
categorization, but it cited another circuit's conclusory finding about a
different organization for support.
C. Boim
The Seventh Circuit in Boim v. Quranic Literacy Institute and
Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development53 offered a different
approach to First Amendment analysis of § 2339B. In Boim, parents of a
terrorism victim brought a civil suit against two organizations which the
plaintiffs claimed supported the FTO Hamas, and therefore aided in
carrying out Hamas' attack on the victim.54 The suit was brought under
18 U.S.C. § 2333, which allows a United States national injured by
international terrorism to bring a civil suit for damages. 55 Although the
terrorist act was not committed directly by the defendants, but instead by
Hamas, plaintiffs offered as one theory of civil liability that a criminal
violation under § 2339A and B gave rise to a civil claim under 18 U.S.C.
56§ 2333. In other words, the plaintiffs argued that if the defendants, as
plaintiffs alleged, donated to Hamas in violation of § 2339B, they may
also be civilly liable to plaintiffs under § 2333. In response, the
defendant organizations argued that "to the extent that [the plaintiffs]
claim is founded on a violation of § 2339B, it cannot withstand First
Amendment scrutiny because § 2339B fails to account for the ...
associational rights of the contributors who donate money for
52. Id. at 1015 (citing Hammoud, 381 F.3d at 328 n.3).
53. 291 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 2002).
54. Id. at 1004.
55. 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (2006). Section 2333 provides in relevant part:
Any national of the United States injured in his or her
person, property, or business by reason of an act of
international terrorism, or his or her estate, survivors, or
heirs, may sue therefore in any appropriate district court of
the United States and shall recover threefold the damages he
or she sustains and the cost of the suit, including attorney's
fees.
Id.
56. Boim, 291 F.3d at 1004-1005.
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humanitarian purposes. '57 Thus the court was forced to deal with the
First Amendment claim against § 2339 in order to resolve the issue of
civil liability.
Before discussing and applying Buckley, the court in Boim
asserted, citing Humanitarian I, that "[c]onduct giving rise to liability
under § 2339B, of course, does not implicate associational or speech
,,58
rights. The court nevertheless discussed Buckley shortly thereafter,
addressing the expressive and associational rights implicated by
contribution restrictions.59 In applying Buckley and analyzing the
importance of the government's interest as part of the test, the court
found "paramount" the government's interest in preventing terrorism,
and also noted that this interest was "unrelated to suppressing free
expression.,, 60 The court also addressed themes from the O'Brien test,
again citing Humanitarian L61 Thus, although the Seventh Circuit in
Boim found that Buckley provided the applicable test for evaluating the
constitutionality of § 2339B, its analysis in holding that § 2339B was
constitutional included a peculiar combination of ideas from Buckley,
Humanitarian I and O'Brien which resulted in mixed signals.
In another peculiar move, the Boim court not only applied
Buckley without hesitation or contemplation of whether O'Brien would
be more appropriate, but also applied Buckley in addressing the
defendants' claim that a ban on contributions under § 2339B "fail[ed] to
account for ... the associational rights of the contributors who donate
money for humanitarian purposes. '62  The decision thus ostensibly
interpreted Buckley as applying to contributions for the purpose of
associating with humanitarian causes, and not just organizations
engaging overwhelmingly in political advocacy as identified by the court
in Humanitarian L The Seventh Circuit in Boim, in an effort to resolve
and reject the defendants' First Amendment argument, seemingly
ignored the disjoint between the Humanitarian I court's view that
57. Id. at 1021.
58. Id. at 1026 (citing Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1133
(9th Cir. 2000)).
59. Id. at 1026-27.
60. Id. at 1027.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1021 (emphasis added).
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contributions violating § 2339B require O'Brien intermediate scrutiny
and its own application of Buckley after finding that no speech or
associational rights are implicated by § 2339B. What is left is an unclear
standard that awkwardly combines other jurisdictions' and Supreme
Court precedent.
D. Al-Arian
In the Eleventh Circuit, the U.S. District Court for the Middle
District of Florida in United States v. Al-Arian63 expressly declined to
follow Humanitarian I in determining what test to apply to a plaintiff s
challenge that § 2339B infringed First Amendment rights of association
and expression. 64 The court instead embraced Buckley as the appropriate
standard, agreeing with the Boim court.65 In a footnote further explaining
its decision to apply Buckley, the court in Al-Arian noted:
This Court disagrees with the Ninth Circuit that
intermediate scrutiny under United States v. O'Brien
applies to whether a prohibition on fundraising and
contribution is constitutional under the First
Amendment . . . . The Ninth Circuit opinion
provides no reason on why Buckley 's contribution
analysis should not apply to other forms of
contributions. This Court sees no basis for a
difference in constitutional analysis between
political contributions and other forms of
contributions. Both have a speech and an
66
associational component.
The court in Al-Arian thus not only rejected the line drawn by
the Ninth Circuit including only contributions to organizations whose
overwhelming function is political advocacy, but appears to include all
contributions as requiring Buckley's higher scrutiny. Although the court
noted that "as a practical matter, it may be easier for the government to
regulate contributions to foreign groups because of the strength of the
63. 308 F. Supp. 2d 1322 (M.D. Fla. 2004).
64. Id. at 1343.
65. Id. at 1342-43.
66. Id. at 1342-43 n.41.
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governmental interests at stake in cases similar to this one," 67 it declined
to define any limits to the scope of Buckley.
III. ANALYSIS
As a practical matter, in each of these § 2339B cases, the choice
between Buckley and O'Brien does not affect the result, as the courts fall
back on the paramount governmental interest in national security, and the
restrictions on contributions survive both the intermediate and
68heightened scrutiny analyses. However, the inconsistency among
jurisdictions reinforces the need for a framework that distinguishes
between those contributions deserving heightened scrutiny under Buckley
and those receiving only the protection of intermediate scrutiny under
O'Brien. Thus, the question emerges from the inconsistent and
inadequate reasoning of the courts in the cases above: where should the
courts draw the line?
69Within the realm of financial contributions there are several
subcategories. As a starting point at one end of this spectrum lie
campaign contributions, or contributions to organizations engaging in
express political or electoral advocacy, described as "pointed
exhortations to vote for particular persons. 7 °  One step away from
entities whose purpose is to defeat or elect a specific candidate, but still
within the realm of political speech, fall contributions to organizations
practicing "issue advocacy.",71 These organizations generally focus on
legislative issues, taking a position on an issue and urging the public to
67. Id.
68. There is, however, additional disagreement among the circuits concerning
the tailoring of restrictions to the ends sought. This separate debate turns on the
existence and potential need for a scienter requirement in the provision of material
support; that is, whether specific intent to further the illegal terrorist aims of the
organization is required, as opposed to mere knowledge of the organization's status.
This topic, however, falls outside the scope of this note.
69. I draw a similar line here to that drawn by the Court in Young, supra, in
distinguishing donations to organizations from giving money to a person. In Young,
the distinction applied to solicitations, but the principles remain largely the same,
and so the framework discussed here applies at a minimum to organizations of some
form.
70. FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 249 (1986).
71. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, 127 S.Ct. 2652, 2659 (2007).
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72
adopt the same view and to contact public officials regarding the issue.
These two types of organizations, in practicing political speech, operate
well within the bounds of the electoral and legislative systems and would
very likely fall easily within Buckley's protection.
Falling further away from organizations engaging in explicit
political speech are contributions to educational and charitable
organizations. Nonprofit educational organizations may focus on a
variety of social issues without engaging directly in the political73
process. Contributions to a charitable or religious organization formed
to address social welfare or humanitarian needs rest near the far end of
the spectrum from express political or electoral advocacy, surpassed only
by contributions to commercial organizations or those organizations
engaging primarily in commercial activity. These latter contributions
might be characterized as payments constituting "private economic
decisions" in exchange for a good or service, where that good or service
was the primary purpose for the payment.74
Despite the mixed signals from the High Court and division
among the lower courts as to the proper standard for analyzing First
Amendment challenges to § 2339B, on close analysis, the Supreme Court
does provide guidance as to when a contribution warrants constitutional
protection. In addressing this question, it is helpful to identify what
contributions would most easily be excluded from Buckley's reach. As a
general First Amendment issue, the Supreme Court has recognized that
"[t]he Constitution... accords a lesser protection to commercial speech
• ,,75
than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression. If the First
Amendment value of a contribution lies in its function as an expression
of support for the views of the recipient, and the message of the recipient
falls within the lesser category of commercial speech, then the
contributions would likely not fall within the heightened protection of
72. Id. at 2667.
73. In fact, tax exempt 501(c)(3) organizations may not engage in campaign
activities or legislative advocacy efforts. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006).
74. Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 632
(1980).
75. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S.
557, 562-63 (1980) (citing Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n., 436 U.S. 447, 456-57
(1978)).
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Buckley. The Court in Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better
Environment,76 while discussing the First Amendment characteristics of
charitable solicitations, distinguished them from "purely commercial
speech. 77  Although the Court noted that the case law excluding
commercial speech from any First Amendment protection was no longer
good law, it focused its holding on the First Amendment protection
afforded to charitable donations, emphasizing the non-commercial First
78Amendment speech involved.
The stance taken by the courts in Boim and Al-Arian, setting no
boundaries to the application of heightened scrutiny under Buckley, may
lead to absurd results. Allowing all contributions to warrant the same
type of associational and expressive protection under the First
Amendment as the express political advocacy in Buckley seems to move
against the grain of the O'Brien Court's concern with creating "an
apparently limitless variety of conduct" with First Amendment strictS79
scrutiny protection. A narrow reading of Buckley might apply the
heightened standard only to campaigns for federal elections, as these
were the types of contributions directly addressed by the Court in that
case. There is, however, support for the proposition that Buckley should
have broader application in analyzing contribution restrictions of various
types. The Court's opinion in Buckley provides evidence of a more
general scope of protected contributions than merely campaign
involvement. In finding that the contribution and expenditure limitations
at issue in Buckley "operate in an area of the most fundamental First
Amendment activities," the Court immediately qualified this statement
by noting that the "[d]iscussion of public issues and debate on the
qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation of the system of
government established by our Constitution., 80 The Court's mention of
public issues leaves us again with a vague First Amendment term,
potentially encompassing a wide variety of social and political issues.
Charitable contributions provide an awkward fit in defining the
scope of Buckley. The Supreme Court in Schaumburg addressed the
76. 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
77. Id. at 632.
78. Id.
79. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
80. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (emphasis added).
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constitutionality of restrictions on solicitations for contributions by
charitable, non-commercial organizations, finding that such solicitations
were protected by the First Amendment.81 The Court invalidated an
ordinance prohibiting solicitations in which the organization could not
show that at least seventy-five per cent of the proceeds went directly to
82the organization's charitable purpose. In addressing the First
Amendment concerns raised by restrictions on charitable solicitations,
the court held:
[C]haritable appeals for funds, on the street or door
to door, involve a variety of speech interests-
communication of information, the dissemination
and propagation of views and ideas, and the
advocacy of causes-that are within the protection of
the First Amendment. Soliciting financial support is
undoubtedly subject to reasonable regulation but the
latter must be undertaken with due regard for the
reality that solicitation is characteristically
intertwined with informative and perhaps persuasive
speech seeking support for particular causes or for
particular views on economic, political, or social
issues, and for the reality that without solicitation the
flow of such information and advocacy would likely
83
cease.
This explanation of the value of solicitations under the First
Amendment raises the concern that, in the event of a total ban on
contributions to a particular organization or group of organizations, the
availability and benefit of solicitation is lost as well. Because
Schaumburg pertains to charitable organizations with seemingly infmite
purposes, ranging from public health and welfare services to legal
defense and political advocacy, an absolute ban on contributions to any
of these organizations would necessarily risk causing the very evil the
Supreme Court was trying to prevent in Schaumburg: the blocking of the
dissemination of advocacy and ideas that flow from solicitation.84 The
81. Village of Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 632.
82. Id. at 624 n.4.
83. Id. at 632.
84. Id.
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high First Amendment value of solicitation thus provides reason to
believe that restrictions on responsive contributions deserve protection as
well.
In addition to protecting contributions merely to preserve
solicitations, there is further evidence that these contributions deserve
protection on their own merits as speech in response to charitable
solicitations. The Court nodded in the direction of expanding Buckley's
contribution holding in Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and
Education Fund.85 In Cornelius, advocacy organizations challenged the
federal government's denial of their participation in the Combined
Federal Campaign ("CFC"), a charity drive created by the federal
government in which federal employees contributed to participating
charitable organizations after receiving literature on these organizations
distributed to them during the workday.16 The plaintiff organizations
claimed that the denial of participation infringed their First Amendment
87
right to charitable solicitation. In supporting its holding that
solicitation within the CFC did deserve First Amendment protection
under Schaumburg, the Court, citing Buckley, noted that "an employee's
contribution in response to a request for funds functions as a general
expression of support for the recipient and its views. '88 The Court thus
applied themes from Buckley outside the context of express or issue
advocacy, but did not explicitly reach the question of whether these
charitable or other advocacy contributions would warrant the heightened
scrutiny standard from Buckley, as it was not at issue in the case.
Despite the variety of factors pointing to an expanded
applicability of heightened scrutiny, one cannot ignore the thirty-six
occasions in which the Court in Buckley used one of the following terms:
political communication, political expression, political speech orS• 89
political association. The Court's choice of language, coupled with the
lack of Supreme Court precedent actually applying Buckley in a different
context, provides reason to rein in the reach of Buckley to political
advocacy organizations, as Humanitarian I suggested. This, however,
85. 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
86. Id. at 792-93.
87. Id. at 795.
88. Id. at 799 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21 (1976)).
89. See Buckley, 424 U.S. atpassim.
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does not end the inquiry, as Humanitarian I and those circuits following
its lead did not define political advocacy, nor did they apply any
reasoning to the organizations at issue in each of those cases.
Perhaps a closer look at the purposes of the First Amendment
and the philosophies behind Schaumburg reveals the need for a broader
definition of political advocacy encompassing contributions in response
to charitable solicitations. In explaining why the contribution limitations
at issue in Buckley "operate[d] in an area of the most fundamental First
Amendment activities," the Court stated that "[t]he First Amendment
affords the broadest protection to such political expression in order 'to
assure [the] unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of
political and social changes desired by the people."' 90 The Court also
stated in its opinion that "[d]emocracy depends on a well-informed
electorate" 9 and that "the central purpose of the Speech and Press
Clauses [is] to assure a society in which 'uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open' public debate concerning matters of public interest would thrive,
for only in such a society can a healthy representative democracy
flourish. '
The accomplishment of these goals necessarily and consequently
includes more than simple campaign speech, and, for that matter,
discussion of legislation. As Alexander Meiklejohn put it:
[The First Amendment] protects the freedom of
those activities of thought and communication by
which we "govern." . . . [V]oting is merely the
external expression of a wide and diverse number of
activities by means of which citizens attempt to
meet the responsibilities of making judgments,
which that freedom to govern lays upon them ....
Self-government can exist only insofar as the voters
acquire the intelligence, integrity, sensitivity, and
generous devotion to the general welfare that, in
theory, casting a ballot is assumed to express ....
[T]here are many forms of thought and expression
90. Id. at 14 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).
91. Id. at 49 n.55.
92. Id. at 93 n.127 (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270
(1964)).
2009]
FIRST AMENDMENT LA W REVIEW
within the range of human communications from
which the voter derives the knowledge, intelligence,
sensitivity to human values.93
Meiklejohn offers four areas which play a role in the operation
of self-governance: "education," "philosophy and science," "literature
and the arts," and "public discussions of public issues., 94 Considering
contributions to organizations in light of Schaumburg and the theory of
self-governance, a solid justification exists for extending Buckley to
encompass the expenditure of money which serves to associate with and
express support for a wide variety of views and agendas. Thus, the term
political advocacy should arguably encompass social movements aimed
at shaping our society.
Previous Supreme Court statements also support the proposition
that political advocacy is broader than legislative or electoral advocacy
alone. In San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic
Committee,95 the Court noted that the organization at issue engaged in
political advocacy, describing it as "chartered as a nonprofit, educational
organization whose purpose is to inform the general public about the
'gay movement' and 'to diminish the ageist, sexist and racist
divisiveness existing in all communities regardless of sexual
orientation."'' 96 The Court thus deemed activities as political advocacy
which seemingly do not predominantly involve lobbying or
electioneering, but instead focus on public education.
As even the court in Al-Arian conceded, the foreign aspects of
the organizations and the contributions' destinations may play a role in
the Executive's need to have greater control in matters of foreign
relations. 97 This consideration, however, should not affect the standard
of scrutiny applied to contributions made by those entitled to
constitutional protection, but would certainly factor into the sufficiency
of the governmental interest involved. Moreover, it is the paramount
nature of the national security interest that brought each of the circuits
93. Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SuP.
CT. REv. 245, 255-56.
94. Id. at 257.
95. 483 U.S. 522 (1987).
96. Id. at 564 n.24.
97. United States v. A1-Arian, 308 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1343 n.41 (M.D. Fla. 2004).
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dealing with the constitutionality of contribution prohibitions under §
2339B to find that, regardless of whether Buckley or O'Brien governed,
the government's interest justified the infringement on First Amendment
rights.
Even in the face of national security concerns, ever-pressing in
each generation, the Constitution demands that the rights of contributors
receive the proper treatment to ensure their protection. If, in the future,
courts are challenged with evaluating contribution restrictions pertaining
to a type of organization not so easily dismissible as a designated
terrorist organization, their choice of test will likely take a more lime-
lighted position. As no clear answer is outlined for circuit courts and
precedent provides a shaky foundation, a close look at the organization's
goals and functions may be helpful in determining who deserves Buckley
protection. Moreover, information on the degree to which the
organization separates functions of advocacy from other perhaps less-
protected functions, and the freedom with which donors may contribute
funds specifically to political advocacy functions to the exclusion of
others may be probative. Regardless of the best approach, it is clear that
where courts fall along the scale has been given inadequate attention
which may have heavy consequences for the freedom to pursue discourse
protected by the First Amendment. However weighty government's
interests may be now and in the future, courts must take the time to
carefully consider what should constitute valid speech that will aid in an
individual's efforts to become an informed member of his or her
enlightened society.
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